Tomster/QubesOS-Scripts
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Add qvm-screenshot-tool

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Signed-off-by: Tommy <contact@tommytran.io>
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Tommy 2025-02-18 00:35:20 -07:00
parent 150c4c5903
commit 39298bc952
Signed by: Tomster
GPG Key ID: 555C902A34EC968F
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Quality of Life.md
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@ -64,6 +64,20 @@ qubes.Gpg * thunderbird vault allow
Note that I just use allow here, because the vault VM on a new Fedora 41 already prompts for confirmation, so I don't wanna have to answer yet another prompt from dom0. Note that I just use allow here, because the vault VM on a new Fedora 41 already prompts for confirmation, so I don't wanna have to answer yet another prompt from dom0.
### qvm-screenshot-tool
```bash
sudo qubes-d0m-update zenity
```
Copy [this file](https://github.com/ben-grande/qubes-qvm-screenshot-tool/blob/master/qvm-screenshot) to `/usr/local/bin` in dom0.
```bash
sudo chmod +x /usr/local/bin
```
Set the `PrntSc` button to run `qvm-screenshot` in shortcut settings.
### Trivial data exfiltration prevention ### Trivial data exfiltration prevention
One trivial way for malicious applications to exfiltrate data from an offline VM is to open a link in a disposable VM with a payload. To prevent this, open the VM settings, go to advanced and set the default disposable template to none. One trivial way for malicious applications to exfiltrate data from an offline VM is to open a link in a disposable VM with a payload. To prevent this, open the VM settings, go to advanced and set the default disposable template to none.