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https://github.com/tommytran732/Arch-Setup-Script
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README.md
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README.md
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[](https://github.com/TommyTran732/Arch-Setup-Script/actions/workflows/shellcheck.yml)
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This is my installer for Arch Linux. It sets up a BTRFS system with encrypted `/boot` and full snapper support (both snapshotting and rollback work!). It also includes various system hardening configurations.
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This is my fork of [easy-arch](https://github.com/classy-giraffe/easy-arch), a **script** made in order to boostrap a basic **Arch Linux** environment with **snapshots** and **encryption** by using a fully automated process (UEFI only).
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The script was originally based off [easy-arch](https://github.com/classy-giraffe/easy-arch). However, it diverges substantially from the original project does not follow its development.
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This fork comes with various security improvements and fully working rollbacks with snapper. I do submit some of the changes here back to upstream as well.
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Visit my Matrix group: https://invite.arcticfoxes.net/#/#tommy:arcticfoxes.net
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Visit my Matrix group: https://matrix.to/#/#tommytran732:matrix.org
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### How to use it?
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### How does it work?
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1. Download an Arch Linux ISO from [here](https://archlinux.org/download/)
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2. Flash the ISO onto an [USB Flash Drive](https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/USB_flash_installation_medium).
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3. Boot the live environment.
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4. Connect to the internet.
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5. `git clone https://github.com/tommytran732/Arch-Setup-Script/`
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6. `cd Arch-Setup-Script`
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7. `chmod u+x ./install.sh`
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8. `./install.sh`
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7. `./install.sh`
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### Secure Boot
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The Secure Boot script can be run after you have rebooted into the system to automate the process of generating your own keys and setting up Secure Boot described at https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Unified_Extensible_Firmware_Interface/Secure_Boot. Please make sure that your firmware is in Setup mode and the TPM is disabled.
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Currently, there is an problem where GRUB requires tpm.mod to be included for signature verification, but if tpm.mod is included and the TPM is enabled it will also attempt to do Measured Boot, breaking the Arch Linux snapshots menu created by grub-btrfs. I have yet to find a solution for this issue.
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### Changes to the original project
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1. Encrypted /boot with LUKS1
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2. SUSE - like partition layout and fully working snapper snapshots & rollback
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3. Minimally setup GNOME with pipewire
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4. AppArmor and Firewalld enabled by default
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5. Defaulting umask to 077
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6. Randomize Mac Address and disable Connectivity Check for privacy
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7. Added some kernel/grub settings from https://github.com/Whonix/security-misc/tree/master/etc/default
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8. Added Secure Boot script
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### Snapper behavior
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The partition layout I use allows us to replicate the behavior found in openSUSE 🦎
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The partition layout I use rallows us to replicate the behavior found in openSUSE 🦎
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1. Snapper rollback <number> works! You will no longer need to manually rollback from a live USB like you would with the @ and @home layout suggested in the Arch Wiki.
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2. You can boot into a readonly snapshot! GDM and other services will start normally so you can get in and verify that everything works before rolling back.
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3. Automatic snapshots on pacman install/update/remove operations
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4. Directories such as /boot, /boot/efi, /var/log, /var/crash, /var/tmp, /var/spool, /var/lib/libvirt/images are excluded from the snapshots as they either should be persistent or are just temporary files. /cryptkey is excluded as we do not want the encryption key to be included in the snapshots, which could be sent to another device as a backup.
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5. GRUB will boot into the default BTRFS snapshot set by snapper. Like on openSUSE, your running system will always be a read-write snapshot in @/.snapshots/X/snapshot.
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5. GRUB will boot into the default BTRFS snapshot set by snapper. Like on SUSE, your running system will always be a read-write snapshot in @/.snapshots/X/snapshot.
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### Security considerations
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### Partitions layout
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Since this is an encrypted /boot setup, GRUB will prompt you for your encryption password and decrypt the drive so that it can access the kernel and initramfs. I am unaware of any way to make it use a TPM + PIN setup.
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| Partition/Subvolume | Label | Mountpoint | Notes |
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|---------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|
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| 1 | ESP | /boot/efi | Unencrypted FAT32 |
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| 2 | @/.snapshots/X/snapshot | / | Encrypted BTRFS |
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| 3 | @/boot | /boot/ | Encrypted BTRFS (nodatacow) |
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| 4 | @/root | /root | Encrypted BTRFS |
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| 5 | @/home | /home | Encrypted BTRFS |
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| 6 | @/.snapshots | /.snapshots | Encrypted BTRFS |
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| 7 | @/srv | /srv | Encrypted BTRFS (nodatacow) |
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| 8 | @/var_log | /var/log | Encrypted BTRFS (nodatacow) |
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| 9 | @/var_log/journal | /var/log/journal | Encrypted BTRFS (nodatacow) |
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| 10 | @/var_crash | /var/crash | Encrypted BTRFS (nodatacow) |
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| 11 | @/var_cache | /var/cache | Encrypted BTRFS (nodatacow) |
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| 12 | @/var_tmp | /var/tmp | Encrypted BTRFS (nodatacow) |
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| 13 | @/var_spool | /var/spool | Encrypted BTRFS (nodatacow) |
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| 14 | @/var_lib_libvirt_images | /var/lib/libvirt/images | Encrypted BTRFS (nodatacow) |
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| 15 | @/var_lib_machines | /var/lib/machines | Encrypted BTRFS (nodatacow) |
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| 16 | @/var_lib_gdm | /var/lib/gdm | Encrypted BTRFS (nodatacow) |
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| 17 | @/var_lib_AccountsService | /var/lib/AccountsService | Encrypted BTRFS (nodatacow) |
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| 18 | @/cryptkey | /cryptkey | Encrypted BTRFS (nodatacow) |
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The implication of this is that an attacker can change your secure boot state with a programmer, replace your grubx64.efi and it will not be detected until its too late.
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### LUKS1 and Encrypted /boot (Mumbo Jumbo stuff)
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This is the same setup that is used on openSUSE. One problem with the way Secure Boot currently works is that the initramfs and a variety of things in /boot are not validated by GRUB whatsoever, even if Secure Boot is active. Thus, they are vulnerable to tampering. My approach as of now is to encrypt the entire /boot partition and have the only that is unencrypted - the grubx64.efi stub - validated by the firmware.
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This type of attack can theoratically be solved by splitting /boot out to a seperate partition and encrypt the root filesystem separately. The key protector for the root filesystem can then be sealed to a TPM with PCR 0+1+2+3+5+7+14. It is a bit more complicated to set up so my installer does not support this (yet!).
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Ideally, I could use GRUB's GPG verification for the initramfs and its configuration files and what not, but then I need to create hooks to sign them everytime they get updated (when a new initramfs gets generated, when grub-btrfs.path gets triggered, when grub gets updated and its config files change, etc). It is quite a tedious task and I have yet to implement or test this out.
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As for why LUKS1 is used, GRUB 2.06 does not work nicely with LUKS2 yet. grub-install will not make GRUB auto detect the LUKS2 partition, and GRUB itself does not support Argon2id (cryptsetup default) as of now anyways. It makes little sense to use GRUB with LUKS2 in its current state, thus I am using LUKS1 to avoid the headache.
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You may also see an a keyfile being created by the script and stored at /cryptkey. This is to avoid getting 2 encryption password prompts (one for GRUB to decrypt the disk so that it can get to the kernel, the initramfs and configuration files and one for the kernel itself to start up the rest of the boot process). As the key resides on an encrypted partition (and so does the initramfs that stores a copy of it), security risks should be minimal. The only time an attacker would have access to it is when they have root, at which point you have a much, much more serious problem. The procedure I am using is describe at https://en.opensuse.org/SDB:Encrypted_root_file_system.
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60
install.sh
60
install.sh
@ -285,22 +285,16 @@ fi
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## Pacstrap
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output 'Installing the base system (it may take a while).'
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if [ "${install_mode}" = 'desktop' ]; then
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pacstrap /mnt base "${kernel}" "${microcode}" apparmor chrony efibootmgr firewalld grub grub-btrfs inotify-tools linux-firmware nano networkmanager reflector sbctl snapper sudo zram-generator nautilus gdm gnome-console gnome-control-center pipewire-alsa pipewire-pulse pipewire-jack
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pacstrap /mnt base "${kernel}" "${microcode}" apparmor chrony firewalld grub grub-btrfs linux-firmware nano networkmanager reflector snapper sudo zram-generator nautilus gdm gnome-console gnome-control-center pipewire-alsa pipewire-pulse pipewire-jack
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elif [ "${install_mode}" = 'server' ]; then
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pacstrap /mnt base "${kernel}" "${microcode}" apparmor chrony efibootmgr firewalld grub grub-btrfs inotify-tools linux-firmware nano networkmanager reflector sbctl snapper sudo zram-generator openssh
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pacstrap /mnt base "${kernel}" "${microcode}" apparmor chrony firewalld grub grub-btrfs linux-firmware nano networkmanager reflector snapper sudo zram-generator openssh
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fi
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if [ "${virtualization}" = 'none' ]; then
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pacstrap /mnt fwupd
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pacstrap /mnt sbctl fwupd
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echo 'UriSchemes=file;https' | sudo tee -a /mnt/etc/fwupd/fwupd.conf
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elif [ "${virtualization}" = 'kvm' ]; then
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pacstrap /mnt qemu-guest-agent
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if [ "${install_mode}" = 'desktop' ]; then
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pacstrap /mnt spice-vdagent
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fi
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fi
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## Install snap-pac list otherwise we will have problems
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pacstrap /mnt snap-pac
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## Generate /etc/fstab.
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@ -336,9 +330,6 @@ sed -i 's/#GRUB_ENABLE_CRYPTODISK=.*/GRUB_ENABLE_CRYPTODISK=y/g' /mnt/etc/defaul
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echo '' >> /mnt/etc/default/grub
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echo '# Booting with BTRFS subvolume
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GRUB_BTRFS_OVERRIDE_BOOT_PARTITION_DETECTION=true' >> /mnt/etc/default/grub
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## Disable root subvol pinning.
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## This is **extremely** important, as snapper expects to be able to set the default btrfs subvol.
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# shellcheck disable=SC2016
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sed -i 's/rootflags=subvol=${rootsubvol}//g' /mnt/etc/grub.d/10_linux
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# shellcheck disable=SC2016
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@ -352,16 +343,11 @@ sed -i "s#quiet#rd.luks.name=${UUID}=cryptroot root=${BTRFS} mitigations=auto,no
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dd bs=512 count=4 if=/dev/random of=/mnt/cryptkey/.root.key iflag=fullblock &>/dev/null
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chmod 000 /mnt/cryptkey/.root.key &>/dev/null
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echo -n "${luks_password}" | cryptsetup luksAddKey /dev/disk/by-partlabel/cryptroot /mnt/cryptkey/.root.key -d -
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sed -i "s#module.sig_enforce=1#module.sig_enforce=1 cryptkey=rootfs:/cryptkey/.root.key#g" /mnt/etc/default/grub
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sed -i 's#FILES=()#FILES=(/cryptkey/.root.key)#g' /mnt/etc/mkinitcpio.conf
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sed -i "s#module.sig_enforce=1#module.sig_enforce=1 rd.luks.key=/cryptkey/.root.key#g" /mnt/etc/default/grub
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## Continue kernel hardening
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unpriv curl https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Kicksecure/security-misc/master/etc/modprobe.d/30_security-misc.conf | tee /mnt/etc/modprobe.d/30_security-misc.conf
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sudo sed -i 's/#[[:space:]]*install msr/install msr/g' /mnt/etc/modprobe.d/30_security-misc.conf
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if [ "${install_mode}" != 'server' ]; then
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sudo sed -i 's/#[[:space:]]*install bluetooth/install bluetooth/g' /mnt/etc/modprobe.d/30_security-misc.conf
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sudo sed -i 's/#[[:space:]]*install btusb/install btusb/g' /mnt/etc/modprobe.d/30_security-misc.conf
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fi
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unpriv curl https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Kicksecure/security-misc/master/usr/lib/sysctl.d/990-security-misc.conf | tee /mnt/etc/sysctl.d/990-security-misc.conf
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sed -i 's/kernel\.yama\.ptrace_scope[[:space:]]*=.*/kernel.yama.ptrace_scope=3/g' /mnt/etc/sysctl.d/990-security-misc.conf
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unpriv curl https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Kicksecure/security-misc/master/etc/sysctl.d/30_silent-kernel-printk.conf | tee /mnt/etc/sysctl.d/30_silent-kernel-printk.conf
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@ -401,23 +387,20 @@ arch-chroot /mnt /bin/bash -e <<EOF
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# Generating locales.my keys aren't even on
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echo "Generating locales."
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locale-gen
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# Create SecureBoot keys. This isn't strictly necessary, but certain things like linux-hardened preset expects it and mkinitcpio will fail without it, sooo...
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sbctl create-keys
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locale-gen &>/dev/null
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# Generating a new initramfs.
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echo "Creating a new initramfs."
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chmod 600 /boot/initramfs-linux*
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mkinitcpio -P
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chmod 600 /boot/initramfs-linux* &>/dev/null
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mkinitcpio -P &>/dev/null
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# Installing GRUB.
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echo "Installing GRUB on /boot."
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grub-install --target=x86_64-efi --efi-directory=/boot/efi --bootloader-id=GRUB --modules="normal test efi_gop efi_uga search echo linux all_video gfxmenu gfxterm_background gfxterm_menu gfxterm loadenv configfile gzio part_gpt cryptodisk luks gcry_rijndael gcry_sha256 btrfs" --disable-shim-lock
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grub-install --target=x86_64-efi --efi-directory=/boot/efi --bootloader-id=GRUB --modules="normal test efi_gop efi_uga search echo linux all_video gfxmenu gfxterm_background gfxterm_menu gfxterm loadenv configfile gzio part_gpt cryptodisk luks gcry_rijndael gcry_sha256 btrfs" --disable-shim-lock &>/dev/null
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# Creating grub config file.
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echo "Creating GRUB config file."
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grub-mkconfig -o /boot/grub/grub.cfg
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grub-mkconfig -o /boot/grub/grub.cfg &>/dev/null
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# Adding user with sudo privilege
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if [ -n "$username" ]; then
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@ -444,22 +427,21 @@ sed -i 's/# \(%wheel ALL=(ALL\(:ALL\|\)) ALL\)/\1/g' /mnt/etc/sudoers
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## Enabling openssh server
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if [ "${install_mode}" = 'server' ]; then
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systemctl enable sshd --root=/mnt
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systemctl enable sshd --root=/mnt &>/dev/null
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fi
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## Enable services
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systemctl enable apparmor --root=/mnt
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systemctl enable chronyd --root=/mnt
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systemctl enable firewalld --root=/mnt
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systemctl enable fstrim.timer --root=/mnt
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systemctl enable gdm.service --root=/mnt
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systemctl enable grub-btrfsd.service --root=/mnt
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systemctl enable NetworkManager --root=/mnt
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systemctl enable reflector.timer --root=/mnt
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systemctl enable snapper-timeline.timer --root=/mnt
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systemctl enable snapper-cleanup.timer --root=/mnt
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systemctl enable systemd-oomd --root=/mnt
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systemctl disable systemd-timesyncd --root=/mnt
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systemctl enable apparmor --root=/mnt &>/dev/null
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systemctl enable chronyd --root=/mnt &>/dev/null
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systemctl enable firewalld --root=/mnt &>/dev/null
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systemctl enable fstrim.timer --root=/mnt &>/dev/null
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systemctl enable grub-btrfs.path --root=/mnt &>/dev/null
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systemctl enable NetworkManager --root=/mnt &>/dev/null
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systemctl enable reflector.timer --root=/mnt &>/dev/null
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systemctl enable snapper-timeline.timer --root=/mnt &>/dev/null
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systemctl enable snapper-cleanup.timer --root=/mnt &>/dev/null
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systemctl enable systemd-oomd --root=/mnt &>/dev/null
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systemctl disable systemd-timesyncd --root=/mnt &>/dev/null
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## Set umask to 077.
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sudo sed -i 's/^UMASK.*/UMASK 077/g' /mnt/etc/login.defs
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