Make grammar changes and other fixes

Signed-off-by: friendly-rabbit-35 <169707731+friendly-rabbit-35@users.noreply.github.com>

content/posts/android/Android Tips.md

@@ -20,9 +20,9 @@ When purchasing a device, you should buy one as new as possible. The software an
 ### Phones to Avoid
 Avoid buying the Fairphone 4, which only has just over 2 years of full security updates since its release date despite them advertising 6 years of support. This is because the System on a Chip they use (Snapdragon 750G) only has 3 years of support from Qualcomm, and the SoC was already old when the phone came out. This is not to mention, the Fairphone 4 [uses the Android Verified Boot Test Key as their OEM keys](https://forum.fairphone.com/t/bootloader-avb-keys-used-in-roms-for-fairphone-3-4/83448/11), effectively making Verified Boot useless. In general, you should check for how long the SoC a phone uses is supported for and not blindly trust the phone manufacturer's claims.
 
-You should also avoid buying the /e/ OS phones (sometimes branded as the Murena phones). /e/ OS in itself extremely insecure, not supporting verified boot, shipping userdebug build, [shipping months old version of Chromium, bundling years old version Orbot into their operating system then marketing it as "Advanced Privacy"](https://divestos.org/misc/e.txt), etc. They have recently also had an incident where their cloud service mishandled session keys and give users access to each other's files, then proceeded to [mislead the users that the server cannot see their files](https://community.e.foundation/t/service-announcement-26-may/41252/30) despite there being no end-to-end encryption.
+You should also avoid buying phones preloaded with /e/ OS (sometimes branded as the Murena phones). /e/ OS in itself is extremely insecure, engaging in security bad practices including, but not limited to, not supporting verified boot; shipping userdebug build; [shipping months-old version of Chromium; and bundling years-old version of Orbot into their operating system, then marketing it as "Advanced Privacy"](https://divestos.org/misc/e.txt). There was also a recent incident where their cloud service mishandled session keys and gave users access to other's files, then proceeded to [mislead users that the server cannot see their files](https://community.e.foundation/t/service-announcement-26-may/41252/30), despite there being no end-to-end encryption.
 
-You should also be very wary of low quality privacy branded phones like the Freedom Phone, BraX2 Phone, Volta Phone, and the like. These are cheap Chinese phones with the [Mediatek Helio P60](https://i.mediatek.com/p60) from 2018, which has already reached end-of-life or is near end-of-life. Needless to say, you should also avoid any vendor who claims they are Zero-day proof like this:
+You should also be very wary of low quality privacy branded phones like the Freedom Phone, BraX2 Phone, Volta Phone, and the like. These are cheap Chinese phones with the [Mediatek Helio P60](https://i.mediatek.com/p60) from 2018, which has already reached or is near end-of-life. Needless to say, you should also avoid any vendor who claims they are Zero-day proof like this:
 
 ![Volta phone](/images/volta-phone.png)
 
@@ -30,15 +30,15 @@ You should also be very wary of low quality privacy branded phones like the Free
 
 ![GrapheneOS Aurora](/images/grapheneos-aurora.jpg)
 
-In certain cases, installing a custom Android-based operating system can help increase your privacy and security. This is rather tricky; however, as the vast majority of these operating systems (a.k.a. "custom ROMs") do exactly the opposite - breaking the Android security model, ruining your security while providing no or dubious privacy benefits.
+In certain cases, installing a custom Android-based operating system can help increase your privacy and security. This is rather tricky, however, as the vast majority of these operating systems (a.k.a. "custom ROMs") do exactly the opposite: break the Android security model, thereby ruining your security while providing no or dubious privacy benefits.
 
-I have written a detailed post on selecting your Android-based operating system, which you can find [here](/posts/os/choosing-your-android-based-operating-system).
+I have written a detailed post on selecting your Android-based operating system, which you can find [here](/posts/android/choosing-your-android-based-operating-system).
 
-**TLDR**: If you are using a modern Pixel, use [GrapheneOS](https://grapheneos.org). If you are on a device supported by [DivestOS](https://divestos.org), use DivestOS. Otherwise, stick to your stock operating system. Do not blindly use an OS just because it is advertised as "degoogled".
+**TLDR**: If you are using a modern Pixel, install [GrapheneOS](https://grapheneos.org). If you are using a device supported by [DivestOS](https://divestos.org), install DivestOS. Otherwise, stick to your stock operating system. Do not blindly use an OS just because it is advertised as "degoogled".
 
 ## Use New Android Versions
 
-It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android not only receive security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes), any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity), whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution.
+It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) version of Android. Newer versions of Android receive not only security updates for the operating system but also important privacy enhancing updates too. For example, [prior to Android 10](https://developer.android.com/about/versions/10/privacy/changes), any apps with the [`READ_PHONE_STATE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#READ_PHONE_STATE) permission could access sensitive and unique serial numbers of your phone such as [IMEI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Equipment_Identity), [MEID](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_equipment_identifier), your SIM card's [IMSI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_mobile_subscriber_identity), whereas now they must be system apps to do so. System apps are only provided by the OEM or Android distribution.
 
 ## Do Not Root Your Phone
 
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ It's important to not use an [end-of-life](https://endoflife.date/android) versi
 
 On Android, the phone unlock (Password, Pin, Pattern) is used to protect the encryption key for your device. Thus, it is vital that your unlock secret is secure and can withstand Bruteforce attacks.
 
-Pattern unlock is extremely insecure and should be avoided at all cost. This is discussed in detail in the [Cracking Android Pattern Lock in Five Attempts](/researches/Cracking-Android-Pattern-Lock-in-Five-Attempts.pdf) research paper.
+Pattern unlock is extremely insecure and should be avoided at all costs. This is discussed in detail in the [Cracking Android Pattern Lock in Five Attempts](/researches/Cracking-Android-Pattern-Lock-in-Five-Attempts.pdf) research paper.
 
 If you trust the hardware enforced rate limiting features (typically done by the [Secure Element](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_cryptoprocessor) or [Trusted Execution Environment](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_execution_environment)) of your device, a 8+ digit PIN may be sufficient.
 
@@ -58,11 +58,11 @@ Ideally, you should use a randomly generated passphrase of 8 words or longe
 
 [Auditor](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Auditor) provides attestation for GrapheneOS phones and the stock operating systems on [a number of devices](https://attestation.app/about). It uses hardware security features to make sure that the firmware and operating system have not been downgraded or tampered with.
 
-Attestation can be done [locally](https://grapheneos.org/install/web#verifying-installation) by pairing with another Android 8+ device or remotely using [the remote attestation service](https://attestation.app/about). To make sure that your hardware and operating system is genuine, perform local attestation immediately after the device has been setup and prior to any internet connection.
+Attestation can be done [locally](https://grapheneos.org/install/web#verifying-installation) by pairing with another Android 8+ device or remotely using [the remote attestation service](https://attestation.app/tutorial#scheduled-remote-verification). To make sure that your hardware and operating system is genuine, perform local attestation immediately after the device has been set up and before connecting to the internet.
 
 ## Use Global Toggles
 
-Modern Android devices have global toggles for disabling Bluetooth and location services. Android 12 introduced toggles for the camera and microphone. When not in use, you should disable these features. Apps cannot use disabled features (even if granted individual permission) until re-enabled.
+Modern Android devices have global toggles for disabling Bluetooth and location services. Android 12 introduced toggles for the camera and microphone. When not in use, you should disable these features. Apps cannot use disabled features (even if granted individual permissions) until re-enabled.
 
 ## Manage Android Permissions
 
@@ -80,9 +80,9 @@ Connectivity checks on Android [do not go through the VPN tunnel](https://mullva
 
 On GrapheneOS, connectivity checks by default are done with GrapheneOS's own servers, instead of with Google ones. A network observer on your ISP’s network can see that you are using a GrapheneOS device. If you are using a VPN and want to appear like a regular Android device to your ISP, go to **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **Internet connectivity check** and select **Standard (Google)** instead. Note that this will not stop a determined adversarial ISP from finding out you are not using stock OS [through your DNS fallback](https://grapheneos.org/faq#default-dns).
 
-If you want to, you can disable connectivity check altogether. Note that this will stop captive portal from working.
+If you want to, you can disable connectivity check altogether. Note that this will stop captive portals from working.
 
-- On GrapheneOS and DivestOS, go to **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **Internet connectivity check** and select **Disabled**
+- On GrapheneOS and DivestOS, go to **Settings** → **Network & internet** → **Internet connectivity check** and select **Disabled**.
 - On other Android-based operating systems, you can [disable captive portal via ADB](https://gitlab.com/CalyxOS/calyxos/-/issues/1226#note_1130393164).
 
 To disable:
@@ -136,9 +136,9 @@ This method is generally less secure than a secondary user profile; however, it
 
 ## Baseband Modem Attack Surface Reduction
 
-By default, your baseband modem will typically set to support just about every generation of mobile cellular technology, from 2G to 5G. This gives a large attack surface.
+By default, your baseband modem will typically be set to support just about every generation of mobile cellular technology, from 2G to 5G. This exposes a large attack surface.
 
-You can reduce this attack surface by limiting the baseband modem to just using the generation that in needs. In most cases, this would be 4G/LTE.
+You can reduce this attack surface by limiting the baseband modem to using just the generation that it needs. In most cases, this would be 4G/LTE.
 
 GrapheneOS has the LTE only mode exposed in settings. You can set this by going to **Settings** → **Internet** → **Your carrier name** → **Preferred network type** → **LTE Only**.
 
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ GrapheneOS's app store is available on [GitHub](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Ap
 
 ### Aurora Store
 
-The [Aurora Store](https://auroraoss.com/download/AuroraStore/) is a proxy for the Google Play Store. It is great for privacy in the sense that it automatically gives you a disposable account to download apps, and it works on Android-based distributions that do not support Google Play Services. That being said, it lacks security features like certificate pinning and does not support Play Asset Delivery.
+The [Aurora Store](https://auroraoss.com/downloads/AuroraStore/) is a proxy for the Google Play Store. It is great for privacy in the sense that it automatically gives you a disposable account to download apps, and it works on Android-based distributions that do not support Google Play Services. That being said, it lacks security features like certificate pinning and does not support Play Asset Delivery.
 
 My recommendation is to stick with the Google Play Store unless your threat model calls for not logging into Google Services at all.