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Typo fixes

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Signed-off-by: Tommy <contact@tommytran.io>
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Tommy 2024-06-10 12:17:44 -07:00
parent 82939616b7
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Signed by: Tomster
GPG Key ID: 555C902A34EC968F
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content/posts/knowledge/Laptop Hardware Security/index.md
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@ -147,11 +147,11 @@ Let's go through some of their claims and contrast that agains reality.
> PureBoot can protect against firmware tampering.
It cannot protect against firmware tampering as discussed in the [Heads](/#heads) section.
It cannot protect against firmware tampering as discussed in the [Heads](#heads) section.
> [The ME is disabled (HAP set to 1), and mostly wiped with `me_cleaner`](https://puri.sm/learn/intel-me/).
They only set the HAP field now, but you have to find that out through a [forum post](https://forums.puri.sm/t/librem-14s-me-disabled-but-not-neutralized/12238). Regardless, they crippled critical security features including the ones described in the [Intel CSME and AMD PSP](/#intel-csme-and-amd-psp) section.
They only set the HAP field now, but you have to find that out through a [forum post](https://forums.puri.sm/t/librem-14s-me-disabled-but-not-neutralized/12238). Regardless, they crippled critical security features including the ones described in the [Intel CSME and AMD PSP](#intel-csme-and-amd-psp) section.
> PureBoot is [not vulnerable](https://puri.sm/posts/pureboot-not-vulnerable-to-uefi-exploits-again/) to UEFI firmware vulnerabilities which lead to Boot Guard bypasses.