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Signed-off-by: Tommy <contact@tommytran.io>
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Tommy 2022-07-27 03:20:20 -04:00 committed by tommytran732
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content/os/Using Lokinet on Qubes OS.md
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@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ author: Tommy
## Creating the TemplateVM
As mentioned [above](#disadvantages), the Lokinet client only works well with Debian-based distributions. This means that our template will have to be one of the Debian-based ones, and I would highly recommend that you convert the official Debian template by the Qubes OS team into a KickSecure template to use as a base. KickSecure reduces the attack surface of Debian with a substantial set of hardening configurations, and a nice feature to go with an anonimity network like Lokinet is [Boot Clock Randomization](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Boot_Clock_Randomization) which helps defend against [time-based denonymization attacks(https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Time_Attacks). You will only need the `kicksecure-cli` meta package (`kicksecure-gui` is unnecessary), and experimental services like `proc-hidepid`, `hide-hardware-info` and `permission-hardening` work just fine with the Lokinet client. [HardenedMalloc](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Hardened_Malloc) and [LKRG](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Linux_Kernel_Runtime_Guard_LKRG) do not cause any problem with Lokinet, either.
As mentioned [above](#disadvantages), the Lokinet client only works well with Debian-based distributions. This means that our template will have to be one of the Debian-based ones, and I would highly recommend that you convert the official Debian template by the Qubes OS team into a KickSecure template to use as a base. KickSecure reduces the attack surface of Debian with a substantial set of hardening configurations, and a nice feature to go with an anonimity network like Lokinet is [Boot Clock Randomization](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Boot_Clock_Randomization) which helps defend against [time-based denonymization attacks(https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Time_Attacks). You will only need the `kicksecure-cli` meta package (`kicksecure-gui` is unnecessary), and experimental services like `proc-hidepid`, `hide-hardware-info` and `permission-hardening` work just fine with the Lokinet client. [Hardened Malloc](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Hardened_Malloc) and [LKRG](https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Linux_Kernel_Runtime_Guard_LKRG) do not cause any problem with Lokinet, either.
Since DNS with Lokinet does not work if it is installed inside of a ProxyVM, we will need to have Lokinet running inside the same AppVM as the applications you intend to run. This is less than ideal, as a compromised AppVM could reveal your IP address. Beyond that, accidental leaks can happen, too.
@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ Next, edit `/var/lib/lokinet/lokinet.ini` and add the exit server you want to us
`exit-node=exit.loki`
Note that I am using `exit.loki` here, as it is the one mentioned in the [Lokinet documentation](https://docs.oxen.io/products-built-on-oxen/lokinet/exit-nodes).
There are some other exit servers listed on [probably.loki](http://probably.loki/wiki/index.php?title=Exit_Nodes) as well, and for your convenience, I will just copy-paste the here:
There are some other exit servers listed on [probably.loki](http://probably.loki/wiki/index.php?title=Exit_Nodes) as well, and for your convenience, I will just copy-paste them here:
- exit.loki (USA, run by Jeff)
- exit2.loki (USA, run by Jeff, same ip as exit.loki)