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Signed-off-by: Tommy <contact@tommytran.io>
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Tommy 2022-07-18 08:16:00 -04:00 committed by tommytran732
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8
content/os/Choosing Your Android-Based Operating System.md
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@ -60,7 +60,9 @@ End users should be using the production `user` builds, and any distributions th
[SELinux](https://source.android.com/security/selinux) is a critical part of the Android security model, having the Linux kernel enforcing confinement for all proccesses, including system processes running as root.
Unfortunately, many custom Android-based operating system builds (especially unofficial LineageOS builds) disables SELinux or set it into permissive mode. You can check whether SELinux is in enforcing mode or not by executing `getenforce` in the ADB shell (the expected output is `Enforcing`). You should avoid any Android-based operating system builds that do not have SELinux in enforcing mode at all cost.
In order for a system to be secure, it must have SELinux in Enforcing mode, accompanied by fine-grained SELinux policies.
Unfortunately, many custom Android-based operating system builds (especially unofficial LineageOS builds) disables SELinux or set it into Permissive mode. You can check whether SELinux is in enforcing mode or not by executing `getenforce` in the ADB shell (the expected output is `Enforcing`). You should avoid any Android-based operating system builds that do not have SELinux in enforcing mode at all cost.
![ADB SELinux](/adb-selinux.png)
@ -73,7 +75,9 @@ Currently, I am only aware of two Android-based operating systems that should be
GrapheneOS is the **only** custom Android-based operating system you should buy a new phone for. It provides additional [security hardening](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardening_(computing)) and privacy improvements over the stock operating system from Google. It has a [hardened memory allocator](https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc), network and sensor permissions, and various other [security feature](https://grapheneos.org/features). GrapheneOS also comes with full firmware updates and signed builds, so verified boot is fully supported.
For usability purposes, GrapheneOS supports [Sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play), which runs Google Play Services fully sandboxed like any other regular app. This means you can take advantage of most Google Play Services, such as [push notifications](https://firebase.google.com/docs/cloud-messaging/), while giving you full control over their permissions and access, and while containing them to a specific work profile or user profile of your choice. Most interestingly, the [In-app Billing API](https://android-doc.github.io/google/play/billing/api.html), [Google Play Games](https://play.google.com/googleplaygames), [Play Asset Delivery](https://developer.android.com/guide/playcore/asset-delivery), [FIDO2](/knowledge/multi-factor-authentication/#fido2-fast-identity-online) all work exceptionally well. Most [Advanced Protection Program](https://landing.google.com/advancedprotection/) features, except for [Play Protect](https://support.google.com/googleplay/answer/2812853?hl=en), also work.
For usability purposes, GrapheneOS supports [Sandboxed Google Play](https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play), which runs Google Play Services fully sandboxed like any other regular app. This means you can take advantage of most Google Play Services, such as [push notifications](https://firebase.google.com/docs/cloud-messaging/), while giving you full control over their permissions and access, and while containing them to a specific work profile or user profile of your choice. Most interestingly, the [In-app Billing API](https://android-doc.github.io/google/play/billing/api.html), [Google Play Games](https://play.google.com/googleplaygames), [Play Asset Delivery](https://developer.android.com/guide/playcore/asset-delivery), [FIDO2](/knowledge/multi-factor-authentication/#fido2-fast-identity-online) all work exceptionally well. Most [Advanced Protection Program](https://landing.google.com/advancedprotection/) features, except for [Play Protect](https://support.google.com/googleplay/answer/2812853?hl=en) and restricted app installation, also work.
Because GrapheneOS does not grant any Google Apps and Services apart from the opt-in eSIM action app privileged access to the system, Play Protect cannot disable or uninstall known malicious applications when it detects them. As for restricted app installation, this feature is not that useful on stock operating system anyways, since it is bypassable with `adb push`.
Recently, GrapheneOS has also added the [Storage Scopes](https://grapheneos.org/usage#storage-access) feature, allowing you to limit what legacy apps which still use the old storage API can access. With this new feature, you no longer have to grant certain apps access to all of your media or files to use them anymore.