mirror of
https://github.com/PrivSec-dev/privsec.dev
synced 2024-12-21 20:31:33 -05:00
Remove Tails
Signed-off-by: Tommy <contact@tommytran.io>
This commit is contained in:
parent
e8f26384c6
commit
e2147aefe6
@ -110,4 +110,4 @@ It comes with substantial hardening over AOSP. DivestOS has automated kernel vul
|
||||
- GrapheneOS's per-network full [MAC randomization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address#Randomization) option on version 17.1 and higher
|
||||
- Automatic reboot/Wi-Fi/Bluetooth [timeout options](https://grapheneos.org/features)
|
||||
|
||||
With that being said, DivestOS is not without its faults. The developer does not have all of the devices he is building for, and for a lot of them he simply publishes the builds blind without actually testing them. Firmware update support [varies](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/firmware-empty/-/blob/master/STATUS) across devices. DivestOS also takes a very long time to update to a new major Android, and actually took longer than CalyxOS did as mentioned [above](#firmware-updates).
|
||||
With that being said, DivestOS is not without its faults. The developer does not have all of the devices he is building for, and for a lot of them he simply publishes the builds blind without actually testing them. Firmware update support [varies](https://gitlab.com/divested-mobile/firmware-empty/-/blob/master/STATUS) across devices. DivestOS also takes a very long time to update to a new major Android, and actually took longer than CalyxOS did as mentioned [above](#firmware-updates). It does not tend to fall behind on Chromium updates, however.
|
||||
|
@ -103,10 +103,4 @@ Some of its features include Tor Stream Isolation, [keystroke anonymization](htt
|
||||
|
||||
Future versions of Whonix will likely include [full system AppArmor policies](https://github.com/Whonix/apparmor-profile-everything) and a [sandbox app launcher](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Sandbox-app-launcher) to fully confine all processes on the system.
|
||||
|
||||
Although Whonix is best used [in conjunction with Qubes](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Qubes/Why_use_Qubes_over_other_Virtualizers), Qubes-Whonix has [various disadvantages](https://forums.whonix.org/t/qubes-whonix-security-disadvantages-help-wanted/8581) when compared to other hypervisors.
|
||||
|
||||
### Tails
|
||||
|
||||
[Tails](https://tails.boum.org/) is a live operating system based on Debian focusing on anonimity and amnesia.
|
||||
|
||||
While it is great for counter forensics as nothing is written to the disk; it is not a hardened distribution like Whonix. It lacks many anonymity and security features that Whonix has and gets updated much less often (only once every six weeks). A Tails system that is compromised by malware may potentially bypass the transparent proxy allowing for the user to be deanonymized.
|
||||
Although Whonix is best used [in conjunction with Qubes](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Qubes/Why_use_Qubes_over_other_Virtualizers), Qubes-Whonix has [various disadvantages](https://forums.whonix.org/t/qubes-whonix-security-disadvantages-help-wanted/8581) when compared to other hypervisors.
|
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: "Linux Insecurities"
|
||||
tags: ['operating systems', 'security', 'linux']
|
||||
tags: ['operating systems', 'linux', 'security',]
|
||||
author: Tommy
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user