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Embed link to relevant section of PrivSec post on FLOSS Security

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content/posts/android/F-Droid Security Issues.md
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@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Normally, the developer is supposed to sign their own app prior to its upload on
On the other hand, the Play Store now manages the app signing keys too. [Play App Signing](https://developer.android.com/studio/publish/app-signing#app-signing-google-play) is required for app bundles which are, in turn, required for new apps since August 2021. These signing keys can be uploaded or automatically generated, and are securely stored by the [Google Cloud Key Management Service](https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/security_whitepapers_march2018.pdf). It should be noted that the developer still has to sign their app with **an upload key** so that Google can verify its authenticity before signing it with the app signing key. For apps created before August 2021 that may have [not opted in Play App Signing](https://developer.android.com/studio/publish/app-signing#opt-out) yet, the developer still manages the private key and is responsible for its security, as a compromised private key can allow a third party to sign and distribute malicious code.
A common refrain used to argue for F-Droid is the claim that the Play Store is filled with malicious apps. Saying this is beside the point, though, as F-Droid's "quality control" offers **close to no guarantees**. Having access to the source code doesn't mean it can be easily reviewed. As such, users should not think of the F-Droid main repository as free of malicious apps, yet unfortunately many are inclined to believe this.
A common refrain used to argue for F-Droid is the claim that the Play Store is filled with malicious apps. Saying this is beside the point, though, as F-Droid's "quality control" offers **close to no guarantees**. Having access to the source code [doesn't mean it can be easily reviewed](https://privsec.dev/posts/knowledge/floss-security/#reverse-engineering). As such, users should not think of the F-Droid main repository as free of malicious apps, yet unfortunately many are inclined to believe this.
> But... can't I just trust F-Droid and be done with it?