PrivSec-dev/privsec.dev
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/PrivSec-dev/privsec.dev synced 2024-11-17 12:01:35 -05:00
Code

Fix dashed word

Browse Source
This commit is contained in:
d4rklynk 2022-07-19 09:11:06 +02:00 committed by tommytran732
parent 4ce61268fc
commit a698a0ac54
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: 060B29EB996BD9F2
3 changed files with 5 additions and 5 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

2
content/apps/F-Droid Security Analysis.md
View File

@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ Unlike other repositories, F-Droid signs all the apps in the main repository wit
Normally, the developer is supposed to sign their own app prior to its upload on a distribution channel, whether that is a website or a traditional repository (or both). You don't have to trust the source (usually recommended by the developer) except for the first installation: future updates will have their authenticity cryptographically guaranteed. The issue with F-Droid is that all apps are signed by the same party (F-Droid) which is also not the developer. You're now adding another party you'll have to trust since **you still have to trust the developer** anyway, which isn't ideal: **the fewer parties, the better**.
On the other hand, Play Store now manages the app signing keys too, as [Play App Signing](https://developer.android.com/studio/publish/app-signing#app-signing-google-play) is required for app bundles which are required for new apps since August 2021. These signing keys can be uploaded or automatically generated, and are securely stored by [Google Cloud Key Management Service](https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/security_whitepapers_march2018.pdf). It should be noted that the developer still has to sign the app with **an upload key** so that Google can verify its authenticity before signing it with the app signing key. For apps created before August 2021 that may have [not opted in Play App Signing](https://developer.android.com/studio/publish/app-signing#opt-out) yet, the developer still manages the private key and is responsible for its security, as a compromised private key can allow a third party to sign and distribute malicious code.
On the other hand, Play Store now manages the app signing keys too, as [Play App Signing](https://developer.android.com/studio/publish/app-signing#app-signing-google-play) is required for app bundles which are required for new apps since August 2021. These signing keys can be uploaded or automatically generated, and are securely stored by [Google Cloud Key Management Service](https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/security_whitepapers_march2018.pdf). It should be noted that the developer still has to sign the app with **an upload key** so that Google can verify its authenticity before signing it with the app signing key. For apps created before August 2021 that may have [not opted in Play App Signing](https://developer.android.com/studio/publish/app-signing#opt-out) yet, the developer still manages the private key and is responsible for its security, as a compromised private key can allow a third-party to sign and distribute malicious code.
F-Droid requires that the source code of the app is exempt from any proprietary library or ad service, according to their [inclusion policy](https://f-droid.org/en/docs/Inclusion_Policy/). Usually, that means that some developers will have to maintain a slightly different version of their codebase that should comply with F-Droid's requirements. Besides, their "quality control" offers **close to no guarantees** as having access to the source code doesn't mean it can be easily proofread. Saying Play Store is filled with malicious apps is beyond the point: the **false sense of security** is a real issue. Users should not think of the F-Droid main repository as free of malicious apps, yet unfortunately many are inclined to believe this.

6
content/knowledge/Multi-factor Authentication.md
View File

@ -18,9 +18,9 @@ Only use these protocols when it is the only option you have, and be very carefu
Push confirmation MFA is typically a notification being sent to an app on your phone asking you to confirm new account logins. This method is a lot better than SMS or email, since an attacker typically wouldn't be able to get these push notifications without having an already logged-in device.
Push confirmation in most cases relies on a third party provider like [Duo](https://duo.com/). This means that trust is placed in a server that neither you nor your service provider control. A malicious push confirmation server could compromise your MFA or profile you based on which website and account you use with the service.
Push confirmation in most cases relies on a third-party provider like [Duo](https://duo.com/). This means that trust is placed in a server that neither you nor your service provider control. A malicious push confirmation server could compromise your MFA or profile you based on which website and account you use with the service.
Even if the push notification application and server is provided by a first party as is the case with Microsoft login and [Microsoft Authenticator](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/mobile-authenticator-app), there is still a risk of you accidentally tapping on the confirmation button.
Even if the push notification application and server is provided by a first-party as is the case with Microsoft login and [Microsoft Authenticator](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/mobile-authenticator-app), there is still a risk of you accidentally tapping on the confirmation button.
### Time-based One-time Password (TOTP)
@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ The service will then forward the one-time password to the Yubico OTP server for
The Yubico validation server is a cloud based service, and you're placing trust in Yubico that their server won't be used to bypass your MFA or profile you. The public ID associated with Yubico OTP is reused on every website and could be another avenue for third-parties to profile you. Like TOTP, Yubico OTP does not provide phishing resistance.
Yubico OTP is an inferior protocol compared to TOTP since TOTP does not need trust in a third party server and most security keys that support Yubico OTP (namely the Yubikey and OnlyKey) supports TOTP anyway. Yubico OTP is still better than Push Confirmation, however.
Yubico OTP is an inferior protocol compared to TOTP since TOTP does not need trust in a third-party server and most security keys that support Yubico OTP (namely the Yubikey and OnlyKey) supports TOTP anyway. Yubico OTP is still better than Push Confirmation, however.
### FIDO2 (Fast IDentity Online)

2
content/os/Linux Insecurities.md
View File

@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ tags: ['Operating Systems', 'Linux', 'Security',]
author: Tommy
---
There is a common misconception among privacy communities that Linux is one of the more secure operating systems, either because it is open source or because it is widely used in the cloud. However, this is a far cry from reality.
There is a common misconception among privacy communities that Linux is one of the more secure operating systems, either because it is open-source or because it is widely used in the cloud. However, this is a far cry from reality.
There is already a very in-depth technical blog explaining the various security weaknesses of Linux by Madaidan, [Whonix](https://www.whonix.org/)'s Security Researcher. This page will attempt to address some of the questions commonly raised in reaction to his blog post. You can find the original article [here](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html).