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@ -140,25 +140,25 @@ F-Droid should enforce the approach of prefixing the package name of their alter
This results in a confusing user experience where it's hard to keep track of who signs each app, and from which repository the app should be downloaded or updated.
## 6. Misleading permissions approach
F-Droid shows a list of the [low-level permissions](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission) for each app: these low-level permissions are usually grouped in the standard high-level permissions (Location, Microphone, Camera, etc.) and special toggles (nearby Wi-Fi networks, Bluetooth devices, etc.) that are explicitly based on a type of sensitive data. While showing a list of low-level permissions could be useful information for a developer, it's often a **misleading** and inaccurate approach for the end-user. Since Android 6, apps have to [request the standard permissions at runtime](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview#runtime) and do not get them simply by being installed, so showing all the "under the hood" permissions without proper context is not useful and makes the permission model unnecessarily confusing.
F-Droid shows a list of the [low-level permissions](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission) for each app. These low-level permissions are usually grouped in the standard, high-level permissions (Location, Microphone, Camera, etc.) and special toggles (nearby Wi-Fi networks, Bluetooth devices, etc.) that are explicitly based on a type of sensitive data. While showing a list of low-level permissions could be useful information for a developer, it's often a **misleading** and inaccurate approach for the end user. Since Android 6, apps have to [request the standard permissions at runtime](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview#runtime) and do not get them simply by being installed, so showing all the "under the hood" permissions without proper context is not useful and makes the permission model unnecessarily confusing.
F-Droid claims that these low-level permissions are relevant because they support Android 5.1+, meaning they support very outdated versions of Android where apps could have [install-time permissions](https://source.android.com/devices/tech/config/runtime_perms). Anyway, if a technical user wants to see all the manifest permissions for some reason, then they can access the app manifest pretty easily (in fact, exposing the raw manifest would be less misleading). But this is already beyond the scope of this article because anyone who cares about privacy and security wouldn't run a 8 years old version of Android that has not received security updates for years.
F-Droid claims that these low-level permissions are relevant because they support Android 5.1+, meaning they support very outdated versions of Android where apps could have [install-time permissions](https://source.android.com/devices/tech/config/runtime_perms). Anyway, if a technical user wants to see all the manifest permissions for some reason, then they can access the app manifest pretty easily (in fact, exposing the raw manifest would be less misleading). But this is already beyond the scope of this article because anyone who cares about privacy and security wouldn't run an 8 years-old version of Android that has not received security updates for years.
A [discussion about this](https://gitlab.com/fdroid/fdroid-website/-/merge_requests/834) took place on F-Droid's GitLab repository. In short, F-Droid downplayed the issue with their misleading permission labels, and their lead developer proceeded to call the Android permission model a "dumpster fire" and claim that the operating system cannot sandbox untrusted apps while still remaining useful.
*To clear up confusion: even apps targeting an API level below 23 (Android 5.1 or older) do not have permissions granted at install time on modern Android, which instead displays a legacy permission grant dialog. Whether or not permissions are granted at install time does not just depend on the app's `targetSdkVersion`. And even if this were the case, the OS package installer on modern Android would've been designed to show the requested permissions for those legacy apps.*
*To clear up any confusion, even apps targeting an API level below 23 (Android 5.1 or older) do not have permissions granted at install time on modern Android; instead, these apps display a legacy permission grant dialog. Whether or not permissions are granted at install time does not just depend on the app's `targetSdkVersion`. And even if this were the case, the OS package installer on modern Android would've been designed to show the requested permissions for those legacy apps.*
For example, the low-level permission `RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED` is referred to in F-Droid as the *run at startup* description, when in fact this permission is not needed to start at boot and just refers to a specific time broadcasted by the system once it finishes booting, and is not about background usage (though power usage may be a valid concern). To be fair, these short summaries used to be provided by the Android documentation years ago, but the permission model has drastically evolved since then and most of them aren't accurate anymore.
For example, the low-level permission `RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED` is referred to in F-Droid as the *run at startup* permission. In fact, this permission is not needed to start at boot, is not about background usage (though power usage may be a valid concern), and just refers to a specific time broadcasted by the system once it finishes booting. To be fair, these short summaries were previously provided by the official Android documentation years ago, but the permission model has drastically evolved since then and most of them aren't accurate anymore.
> *Allows the app to have itself started as soon as the system has finished booting. This can make it take longer to start the phone and allow the app to slow down the overall phone by always running.*
In modern Android, the background restriction toggle is what really provides the ability for apps to run in the background. Some low-level permissions don't even have a security/privacy impact and shouldn't be misinterpreted as having one. Anyhow, you can be sure that each dangerous low-level permission has a **high-level representation** that is **disabled by default** and needs to be **granted dynamically** to the app (by a toggle or explicit user consent in general).
Another example to illustrate the shortcomings of this approach would be the `QUERY_ALL_PACKAGES` low-level permission, which is referred to as the *query all packages* permission that "allows an app to see all installed packages". While this is somewhat correct, this can also be misleading: apps do not need `QUERY_ALL_PACKAGES` to list other apps within the same user profile. Even without this permission, some apps are visible automatically (visibility is restricted by default [since Android 11](https://developer.android.com/training/package-visibility)). If an app needs more visibility, it will declare a `<queries>` element in its manifest file: in other words, `QUERY_ALL_PACKAGES` is only one way to achieve visibility. Again, this goes to show low-level manifest permissions are not intended to be interpreted as high-level permissions the user should fully comprehend.
Another example to illustrate the shortcomings of this approach would be the `QUERY_ALL_PACKAGES` low-level permission, which is referred to in F-Droid as the *query all packages* permission that "allows an app to see all installed packages". While this description is somewhat correct, it can also be misleading: apps do not need `QUERY_ALL_PACKAGES` to list other apps within the same user profile. Even without this permission, some apps are visible automatically (visibility is restricted by default [since Android 11](https://developer.android.com/training/package-visibility)). If an app needs more visibility, it will declare a `<queries>` element in its manifest file. In other words, `QUERY_ALL_PACKAGES` is only one way to achieve visibility. Again, this goes to show how low-level manifest permissions are not intended to be interpreted as high-level permissions that the user should fully comprehend.
Play Store for instance conveys the permissions in a way less misleading way: the main low-level permissions are first grouped in their high-level user-facing toggles, and the rest is shown under "Other". This permission list can only be accessed by taping "About this app" then "App permissions - See more" at the bottom of the page. Play Store will tell the app may request access to the following permissions: this kind of wording is more important than it seems. *Update: since July 2022, Play Store doesn't offer a way to display low-level permissions anymore.*
The Play Store for instance conveys the permissions in a far less misleading way: the main low-level permissions are first grouped in their high-level user-facing toggles, and the rest is shown under "Other". This permission list can only be accessed by tapping "About this app" then "App permissions - See more" at the bottom of the page. The Play Store will inform the user that the app may request access to the following permissions; this kind of wording is more important than it seems. *Update: since July 2022, the Play Store doesn't offer a way to display low-level permissions anymore.*
Moreover, [Play Store restricts the use of highly invasive permissions](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/9888170) such as `MANAGE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE` which allows apps to opt out of scoped storage if they can't work with [more privacy friendly approaches](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/providers/document-provider) (like a file explorer). Apps that can't justify their use of this permission (which again has to be granted dynamically) may be removed from Play Store. This is where an app repository can actually be useful in their review process to protect end-users from installing poorly made apps that might compromise their privacy. Not that it matters much if these apps target very old API levels that are inclined to require invasive permissions in the first place...
Moreover, [the Play Store restricts the use of highly invasive permissions](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/9888170) such as `MANAGE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE`, which allows apps to opt out of scoped storage if they can't work with [more privacy friendly approaches](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/providers/document-provider) (like a file explorer). Apps that can't justify their use of this permission (which again has to be granted dynamically) may be removed from Play Store. This is where an app repository can actually shine, particularly with a review process to protect end users from installing poorly made apps that might compromise their privacy. Not that it matters much if these apps target very old API levels that are inclined to require invasive permissions in the first place...
## Conclusion: what should you do?
So far, you have been presented with referenced facts that are easily verifiable. In the next part, I'll allow myself to express my own thoughts and opinions. You're free to disagree with them, but don't let that overshadow the rest.