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content/posts/knowledge/ChromeOS Questionable Encryption/index.md
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@ -17,12 +17,14 @@ The very same Google account passwords used for ChromeOS authentication are also
![Google Login](google-login.jpg)
…it turns out that passwords are submitted to Google servers in plaintext (see "mygloriouspassword" in the Form Data). As a result, someone with sufficient access to Google's servers would theoretically be able to obtain the actual, unhashed password for a given Google account. It follows that an adversary with physical access would be able to unlock and decrypt ChromeOS user data with cooperation from Google.
…It turns out that passwords are submitted to Google servers in plaintext (see "mygloriouspassword" in the Form Data).
This differs from how encryption passwords are handled by other services like cloud‑based password managers — using _client‑side hashing_. Client‑side hashing is a technique to deliberately blind the server from the actual password. As the name suggests, the browser locally executes a cryptographic hash function on the actual password and only transmits the _resultant hash_ to the server for authentication.
As a result, someone with sufficient access to Google's servers would theoretically be able to obtain the actual, unhashed password for a given Google account. An adversary with physical access would be able to unlock and decrypt ChromeOS user data with cooperation from Google.
This differs from how encryption passwords are handled by other services like cloud‑based password managers — they use _client‑side hashing_ to deliberately blind the server from the actual password. As the name suggests, the browser locally executes a cryptographic hash function on the actual password and only transmits the _resultant hash_ to the server for authentication.
## Takeaways
If Google is malicious, coerced by the government, or hacked, their servers can record the user password prior to it being hashed. That password can then be used to gain access to the files on ChromeOS hardware if the adversary gains physical access.
If Google is malicious, coerced by the government, or hacked, their servers can record the user password prior to it being hashed server‑side. That password can then be used by an adversary with physical access to unlock ChromeOS and gain access to the data stored therein.
Just to be clear, this is not a vulnerability. It's just how the system is designed.