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Update references

Signed-off-by: Raja Grewal <rg_public@proton.me>
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@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ One of the key principle components involved in maintaining both strong privacy
Building on this, both independent and mainstream media are constantly awash with stories regarding the frequent discoveries of sophisticated malware installed on users phones that have the ability totally compromise a device by giving external parties effectively root access. The most well-known of these variants of spyware target hitherto unknown zero-day exploits as thoroughly discussed by [Amnesty International Security Lab](https://www.amnesty.org/en/tech/) and [The Citizen Lab](https://citizenlab.ca/).
For example, there is very little any end-user can do to detect intrusions by the infamous Pegasus spyware made by the NSO Group, see [[1](https://citizenlab.ca/2016/08/million-dollar-dissident-iphone-zero-day-nso-group-uae/), [2](https://citizenlab.ca/2020/12/the-great-ipwn-journalists-hacked-with-suspected-nso-group-imessage-zero-click-exploit/), [3](https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2021/07/forensic-methodology-report-how-to-catch-nso-groups-pegasus/), [4](https://forbiddenstories.org/case/the-pegasus-project/), [5](https://citizenlab.ca/2021/09/forcedentry-nso-group-imessage-zero-click-exploit-captured-in-the-wild/) [6](https://citizenlab.ca/2022/01/project-torogoz-extensive-hacking-media-civil-society-el-salvador-pegasus-spyware/), [7](https://citizenlab.ca/2022/02/bahraini-activists-hacked-with-pegasus/), [8](https://citizenlab.ca/2022/04/peace-through-pegasus-jordanian-human-rights-defenders-and-journalists-hacked-with-pegasus-spyware/), [9](https://citizenlab.ca/2022/04/uk-government-officials-targeted-pegasus/), [10](https://citizenlab.ca/2022/07/geckospy-pegasus-spyware-used-against-thailands-pro-democracy-movement/), [11](https://citizenlab.ca/2022/10/new-pegasus-spyware-abuses-identified-in-mexico/), [12](https://citizenlab.ca/2023/04/nso-groups-pegasus-spyware-returns-in-2022/), [13](https://citizenlab.ca/2023/05/cr1-armenia-pegasus/)]. Other high-profile recent examples of mercenary spyware vendors include [Candiru](https://citizenlab.ca/2021/07/hooking-candiru-another-mercenary-spyware-vendor-comes-into-focus/), [Intellexa](https://blog.talosintelligence.com/mercenary-intellexa-predator/) ([Cytrox](https://citizenlab.ca/2021/12/pegasus-vs-predator-dissidents-doubly-infected-iphone-reveals-cytrox-mercenary-spyware/)), an [undisclosed company](https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/03/new-android-hacking-campaign-linked-to-mercenary-spyware-company/), [QuaDream](https://citizenlab.ca/2023/04/spyware-vendor-quadream-exploits-victims-customers/), a [mysterious source](https://securelist.com/trng-2023/), and [APT41](https://www.lookout.com/threat-intelligence/article/wyrmspy-dragonegg-surveillanceware-apt41).
For example, there is very little any end-user can do to detect intrusions by the infamous Pegasus spyware made by the NSO Group, see [[1](https://citizenlab.ca/2016/08/million-dollar-dissident-iphone-zero-day-nso-group-uae/), [2](https://citizenlab.ca/2020/12/the-great-ipwn-journalists-hacked-with-suspected-nso-group-imessage-zero-click-exploit/), [3](https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2021/07/forensic-methodology-report-how-to-catch-nso-groups-pegasus/), [4](https://forbiddenstories.org/case/the-pegasus-project/), [5](https://citizenlab.ca/2021/09/forcedentry-nso-group-imessage-zero-click-exploit-captured-in-the-wild/) [6](https://citizenlab.ca/2022/01/project-torogoz-extensive-hacking-media-civil-society-el-salvador-pegasus-spyware/), [7](https://citizenlab.ca/2022/02/bahraini-activists-hacked-with-pegasus/), [8](https://citizenlab.ca/2022/04/peace-through-pegasus-jordanian-human-rights-defenders-and-journalists-hacked-with-pegasus-spyware/), [9](https://citizenlab.ca/2022/04/uk-government-officials-targeted-pegasus/), [10](https://citizenlab.ca/2022/07/geckospy-pegasus-spyware-used-against-thailands-pro-democracy-movement/), [11](https://citizenlab.ca/2022/10/new-pegasus-spyware-abuses-identified-in-mexico/), [12](https://citizenlab.ca/2023/04/nso-groups-pegasus-spyware-returns-in-2022/), [13](https://citizenlab.ca/2023/05/cr1-armenia-pegasus/)]. A similar situation is exists with the Predator spyware created by Intellexa (formerly known as Cytrox), see [[14](https://citizenlab.ca/2021/12/pegasus-vs-predator-dissidents-doubly-infected-iphone-reveals-cytrox-mercenary-spyware), [15](https://blog.talosintelligence.com/mercenary-intellexa-predator/), [16](https://citizenlab.ca/2023/09/predator-in-the-wires-ahmed-eltantawy-targeted-with-predator-spyware-after-announcing-presidential-ambitions/)]. Other high-profile recent examples of mercenary spyware vendors include [Candiru](https://citizenlab.ca/2021/07/hooking-candiru-another-mercenary-spyware-vendor-comes-into-focus/), an [undisclosed company](https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/03/new-android-hacking-campaign-linked-to-mercenary-spyware-company/), [QuaDream](https://citizenlab.ca/2023/04/spyware-vendor-quadream-exploits-victims-customers/), a [mysterious source](https://securelist.com/trng-2023/), and [APT41](https://www.lookout.com/threat-intelligence/article/wyrmspy-dragonegg-surveillanceware-apt41).
It should also be recognised and stressed that being targeted by complex mercenary spyware is an expensive undertaking and so the overwhelming majority individuals are very unlikely to be affected. The confirmed targets involve politicians, activists, developers of AI-based guidance systems, lawyers, journalists, and whistleblowers. See The Citizen Lab's [publication list](https://citizenlab.ca/publications/) for more references.
@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ Therefore, as with “anti-virus” programs, `mvt` is simply a detection tool w
## Advanced extensions
Tools like `mvt` are powered by the use of [Structured Threat Information Expression (STIX)](https://oasis-open.github.io/cti-documentation/stix/intro.html) files to identify potential traces of compromise. The existing downloaded indicators can observed on any Linux distribution in the `.local/share/mvt/indicators/` directory of the users home directory. While at first glance these files can be bewildering, their structure is relatively simple when analysed in terms of [relationships between entries](https://oasis-open.github.io/cti-documentation/examples/visualized-sdo-relationships) (graph database) and their respective [definitions](https://docs.oasis-open.org/cti/stix/v2.0/stix-v2.0-part2-stix-objects.html).
Tools like `mvt` are powered by the use of [Structured Threat Information Expression (STIX)](https://oasis-open.github.io/cti-documentation/stix/intro.html) files to identify potential traces of compromise. The existing downloaded indicators can observed on any Linux distribution in the `.local/share/mvt/indicators/` directory of the users home directory. While at first glance these files can be bewildering, their structure is relatively simple when analysed in terms of [relationships between entries](https://oasis-open.github.io/cti-documentation/examples/visualized-sdo-relationships) (graph database) and their respective [definitions](https://docs.oasis-open.org/cti/stix/v2.1/os/stix-v2.1-os.html).
The large flexibility of this format combined with ready-made tools like `mvt` have the capacity to empower any end-user to perform fully customised deep scans of their mobile devices using indicators of their choosing. One application of this incredibly powerful method is to allow anyone (with minimal `mvt` modifications) to comprehensively detect in the history of their device the presence any user-defined domain, server, or connection deemed to be suspicious.