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Signed-off-by: Tommy <contact@tommytran.io>
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Tommy 2022-07-19 11:05:00 -04:00 committed by tommytran732
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11 changed files with 112 additions and 4 deletions
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4
content/apps/F-Droid Security Analysis.md
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@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
---
title: "F-Droid Security Analysis"
date: 2022-01-02T21:28:31Z
tags: ['Applications', 'Android', 'Security']
author: Wonderfall
canonicalURL: https://wonderfall.dev/fdroid-issues
@ -24,7 +25,7 @@ Unlike other repositories, F-Droid signs all the apps in the main repository wit
Normally, the developer is supposed to sign their own app prior to its upload on a distribution channel, whether that is a website or a traditional repository (or both). You don't have to trust the source (usually recommended by the developer) except for the first installation: future updates will have their authenticity cryptographically guaranteed. The issue with F-Droid is that all apps are signed by the same party (F-Droid) which is also not the developer. You're now adding another party you'll have to trust since **you still have to trust the developer** anyway, which isn't ideal: **the fewer parties, the better**.
On the other hand, Play Store now manages the app signing keys too, as [Play App Signing](https://developer.android.com/studio/publish/app-signing#app-signing-google-play) is required for app bundles which are required for new apps since August 2021. These signing keys can be uploaded or automatically generated, and are securely stored by [Google Cloud Key Management Service](https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/security_whitepapers_march2018.pdf). It should be noted that the developer still has to sign the app with **an upload key** so that Google can verify its authenticity before signing it with the app signing key. For apps created before August 2021 that may have [not opted in Play App Signing](https://developer.android.com/studio/publish/app-signing#opt-out) yet, the developer still manages the private key and is responsible for its security, as a compromised private key can allow a third-party to sign and distribute malicious code.
On the other hand, Play Store now manages the app signing keys too, as [Play App Signing](https://developer.android.com/studio/publish/app-signing#app-signing-google-play) is required for app bundles which are required for new apps since August 2021. These signing keys can be uploaded or automatically generated, and are securely stored by [Google Cloud Key Management Service](https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/security_whitepapers_march2018.pdf). It should be noted that the developer still has to sign the app with **an upload key** so that Google can verify its authenticity before signing it with the app signing key. For apps created before August 2021 that may have [not opted in Play App Signing](https://developer.android.com/studio/publish/app-signing#opt-out) yet, the developer still manages the private key and is responsible for its security, as a compromised private key can allow a third party to sign and distribute malicious code.
F-Droid requires that the source code of the app is exempt from any proprietary library or ad service, according to their [inclusion policy](https://f-droid.org/en/docs/Inclusion_Policy/). Usually, that means that some developers will have to maintain a slightly different version of their codebase that should comply with F-Droid's requirements. Besides, their "quality control" offers **close to no guarantees** as having access to the source code doesn't mean it can be easily proofread. Saying Play Store is filled with malicious apps is beyond the point: the **false sense of security** is a real issue. Users should not think of the F-Droid main repository as free of malicious apps, yet unfortunately many are inclined to believe this.
@ -154,6 +155,7 @@ In modern Android, the background restriction toggle is what really provides the
Another example to illustrate the shortcomings of this approach would be the `QUERY_ALL_PACKAGES` low-level permission, which is referred to as the *query all packages* permission that "allows an app to see all installed packages". While this is somewhat correct, this can also be misleading: apps do not need `QUERY_ALL_PACKAGES` to list other apps within the same user profile. Even without this permission, some apps are visible automatically (visibility is restricted by default [since Android 11](https://developer.android.com/training/package-visibility)). If an app needs more visibility, it will declare a `<queries>` element in its manifest file: in other words, `QUERY_ALL_PACKAGES` is only one way to achieve visibility. Again, this goes to show low-level manifest permissions are not intended to be interpreted as high-level permissions the user should fully comprehend.
Play Store for instance conveys the permissions in a way less misleading way: the main low-level permissions are first grouped in their high-level user-facing toggles, and the rest is shown under "Other". This permission list can only be accessed by taping "About this app" then "App permissions - See more" at the bottom of the page. Play Store will tell the app may request access to the following permissions: this kind of wording is more important than it seems. *Update: since July 2022, Play Store doesn't offer a way to display low-level permissions anymore.*
Moreover, [Play Store restricts the use of highly invasive permissions](https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/9888170) such as `MANAGE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE` which allows apps to opt out of scoped storage if they can't work with [more privacy friendly approaches](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/providers/document-provider) (like a file explorer). Apps that can't justify their use of this permission (which again has to be granted dynamically) may be removed from Play Store. This is where an app repository can actually be useful in their review process to protect end-users from installing poorly made apps that might compromise their privacy. Not that it matters much if these apps target very old API levels that are inclined to require invasive permissions in the first place...

1
content/knowledge/Commercial VPN Use Cases.md
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@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
---
title: "Commercial VPN Use Cases"
date: 2022-07-19
tags: ['Knowledge base', 'VPN', 'Privacy']
author: Tommy
---

1
content/knowledge/Multi-factor Authentication.md
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@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
---
title: "Multi-factor Authentication"
date: 2022-07-16
tags: ['Knowledge Base', 'Security']
author: Tommy
---

1
content/knowledge/Threat Modeling.md
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@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
---
title: "Threat Modeling"
date: 2022-07-18
tags: ['Knowledge base', 'Privacy', 'Security']
author: Tommy
---

1
content/os/Choosing Your Android-Based Operating System.md
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@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
---
title: "Choosing Your Android-Based Operating System"
date: 2022-07-18
tags: ['Operating Systems', 'Android', 'Privacy', 'Security']
author: Tommy
---

1
content/os/Choosing Your Desktop Linux Distribution.md
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@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
---
title: "Choosing Your Desktop Linux Distribution"
date: 2022-07-17
tags: ['Operating Systems', 'Linux', 'Security']
author: Tommy
---

1
content/os/Docker and OCI Hardening.md
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@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
---
title: "Docker and OCI Hardening"
date: 2022-03-30T21:23:12Z
tags: ['Operating Systems', 'Linux', 'Container', 'Security']
author: Wonderfall
canonicalURL: https://wonderfall.dev/docker-hardening/

1
content/os/Linux Insecurities.md
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@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
---
title: "Linux Insecurities"
date: 2022-07-18
tags: ['Operating Systems', 'Linux', 'Security',]
author: Tommy
---

1
content/os/Securing OpenSSH with FIDO2.md
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@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
---
title: "Securing OpenSSH with FIDO2"
date: 2022-04-09T17:43:12Z
tags: ['Operating Systems', 'Linux', 'Security']
author: Wonderfall
canonicalURL: https://wonderfall.dev/openssh-fido2/

3
external-blogs.sh
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@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ echo "Fetching and Modifying the F-Droid Security Analysis post"
rm -rf './content/apps/F-Droid Security Analysis.md'
curl https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Wonderfall/wonderfall.github.io/main/content/posts/fdroid-issues.md -o './content/apps/F-Droid Security Analysis.md'
sed -i 's/title:.*/title: "F-Droid Security Analysis"/' './content/apps/F-Droid Security Analysis.md'
sed -i '/date:.*/d' './content/apps/F-Droid Security Analysis.md'
sed -i '/draft:.*/d' './content/apps/F-Droid Security Analysis.md'
sed -i "s/tags:.*/tags: ['Applications', 'Android', 'Security']/" './content/apps/F-Droid Security Analysis.md'
sed -i '/^tags:.*/a ShowCanonicalLink: true' './content/apps/F-Droid Security Analysis.md'
@ -18,7 +17,6 @@ echo "Fetching and Modifying the Docker and OCI Hardening post"
rm -rf './content/os/Docker and OCI Hardening.md'
curl https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Wonderfall/wonderfall.github.io/main/content/posts/docker-hardening.md -o './content/os/Docker and OCI Hardening.md'
sed -i 's/title:.*/title: "Docker and OCI Hardening"/' './content/os/Docker and OCI Hardening.md'
sed -i '/date:.*/d' './content/os/Docker and OCI Hardening.md'
sed -i '/draft:.*/d' './content/os/Docker and OCI Hardening.md'
sed -i "s/tags:.*/tags: ['Operating Systems', 'Linux', 'Container', 'Security']/" './content/os/Docker and OCI Hardening.md'
sed -i '/^tags:.*/a ShowCanonicalLink: true' './content/os/Docker and OCI Hardening.md'
@ -30,7 +28,6 @@ echo "Fetching and Modifying the OpenSSH with FIDO2 Hardening post"
rm -rf './content/os/Securing OpenSSH with FIDO2.md'
curl https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Wonderfall/wonderfall.github.io/main/content/posts/openssh-fido2.md -o './content/os/Securing OpenSSH with FIDO2.md'
sed -i 's/title:.*/title: "Securing OpenSSH with FIDO2"/' './content/os/Securing OpenSSH with FIDO2.md'
sed -i '/date:.*/d' './content/os/Securing OpenSSH with FIDO2.md'
sed -i '/draft:.*/d' './content/os/Securing OpenSSH with FIDO2.md'
sed -i "s/tags:.*/tags: ['Operating Systems', 'Linux', 'Security']/" './content/os/Securing OpenSSH with FIDO2.md'
sed -i '/^tags:.*/a ShowCanonicalLink: true' './content/os/Securing OpenSSH with FIDO2.md'

101
layouts/_default/list.html Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
{{- define "main" }}
{{- if (and site.Params.profileMode.enabled .IsHome) }}
{{- partial "index_profile.html" . }}
{{- else }} {{/* if not profileMode */}}
{{- if not .IsHome | and .Title }}
<header class="page-header">
{{- partial "breadcrumbs.html" . }}
<h1>
{{ .Title }}
{{- if and (or (eq .Kind `term`) (eq .Kind `section`)) (.Param "ShowRssButtonInSectionTermList") }}
<a href="index.xml" title="RSS" aria-label="RSS">
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2"
stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" height="23">
<path d="M4 11a9 9 0 0 1 9 9" />
<path d="M4 4a16 16 0 0 1 16 16" />
<circle cx="5" cy="19" r="1" />
</svg>
</a>
{{- end }}
</h1>
{{- if .Description }}
<div class="post-description">
{{ .Description | markdownify }}
</div>
{{- end }}
</header>
{{- end }}
{{- if .Content }}
<div class="post-content">
{{- if not (.Param "disableAnchoredHeadings") }}
{{- partial "anchored_headings.html" .Content -}}
{{- else }}{{ .Content }}{{ end }}
</div>
{{- end }}
{{- $pages := union .RegularPages .Sections }}
{{- if .IsHome }}
{{- $pages = where site.RegularPages "Type" "in" site.Params.mainSections }}
{{- end }}
{{- $paginator := .Paginate $pages }}
{{- if and .IsHome site.Params.homeInfoParams (eq $paginator.PageNumber 1) }}
{{- partial "home_info.html" . }}
{{- end }}
{{- $term := .Data.Term }}
{{- range $index, $page := $paginator.Pages.ByTitle }}
{{- $class := "post-entry" }}
{{- $user_preferred := or site.Params.disableSpecial1stPost site.Params.homeInfoParams }}
{{- if (and $.IsHome (eq $paginator.PageNumber 1) (eq $index 0) (not $user_preferred)) }}
{{- $class = "first-entry" }}
{{- else if $term }}
{{- $class = "post-entry tag-entry" }}
{{- end }}
<article class="{{ $class }}">
{{- $isHidden := (site.Params.cover.hidden | default site.Params.cover.hiddenInList) }}
{{- partial "cover.html" (dict "cxt" . "IsHome" true "isHidden" $isHidden) }}
<header class="entry-header">
<h2>
{{- .Title }}
{{- if .Draft }}<sup><span class="entry-isdraft">&nbsp;&nbsp;[draft]</span></sup>{{- end }}
</h2>
</header>
{{- if (ne (.Param "hideSummary") true) }}
<div class="entry-content">
<p>{{ .Summary | plainify | htmlUnescape }}{{ if .Truncated }}...{{ end }}</p>
</div>
{{- end }}
{{- if not (.Param "hideMeta") }}
<footer class="entry-footer">
{{- partial "post_meta.html" . -}}
</footer>
{{- end }}
<a class="entry-link" aria-label="post link to {{ .Title | plainify }}" href="{{ .Permalink }}"></a>
</article>
{{- end }}
{{- if gt $paginator.TotalPages 1 }}
<footer class="page-footer">
<nav class="pagination">
{{- if $paginator.HasPrev }}
<a class="prev" href="{{ $paginator.Prev.URL | absURL }}">« {{ i18n "prev_page" }}</a>
{{- end }}
{{- if $paginator.HasNext }}
<a class="next" href="{{ $paginator.Next.URL | absURL }}">{{ i18n "next_page" }} »</a>
{{- end }}
</nav>
</footer>
{{- end }}
{{- end }}{{/* end profileMode */}}
{{- end }}{{- /* end main */ -}}