Clean up Secure Boot section (#265)

* Clean up Secure Boot section

Signed-off-by: Tommy <contact@tommytran.io>

---------

Signed-off-by: Tommy <contact@tommytran.io>

content/posts/linux/Desktop Linux Hardening.md

@@ -520,46 +520,14 @@ For Fedora Workstation, you can follow [Håvard Moen's guide](https://haava
 
 On Arch, the process is very similar, though sbctl is already included in the official repositories and you will need to switch from [mkinitcpio](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Mkinitcpio) to dracut. Arch with linux‑hardened works well with sbctl, but some level of tedious pacman hooks are required for appropriately timing the re‑signing of all relevant files every time the kernel or bootloader is updated.
 
-In my opinion, this is the most straightforward setup, with a lot of potential such as [systemd's future UKI plans including support for early‑boot attestation](https://0pointer.de/blog/brave-new-trusted-boot-world.html). With that being said, it does not appear to work well with specialized setups such as Fedora Silverblue/Kinoite or Ubuntu with [ZSys](https://github.com/ubuntu/zsys). More testing is needed to see if they can be made to work.
+Afterwards, you need to use `systemd-cryptenoll` and pin your encryption key against [certain PCRs](https://uapi-group.org/specifications/specs/linux_tpm_pcr_registry/) to detect tampering against the firmware. At minimum, you should pin PCR 7 for Secure Boot polices. Personally, I pin PCR 0,1,2,3,5,7, and 14.
 
-### Encrypted /boot
+Whenever you manually generate a UKI, make sure that the kernel is from the distribution vendor, and that initramfs is freshly generated. Reinstall the kernel package if you have to.
 
-#### openSUSE
+In my opinion, this is the most straightforward setup. However, it does not appear to work well with specialized setups such as Fedora Silverblue/Kinoite. More testing is needed to see if they can be made to work.
-
-openSUSE and its derivatives come with encrypted /boot out of the box (as part of the root partition). This setup does work, using encryption to sidestep the unverified initramfs problem.
-
-However, there are some caveats:
-
-- openSUSE uses LUKS1 instead of LUKS2 for encryption.
-- GRUB supports PBKDF2 key derivation only, not Argon2 (the LUKS2 default).
-- Some extra steps are necessary to [avoid typing the encryption password twice](https://en.opensuse.org/SDB:Encrypted_root_file_system#Avoiding_to_type_the_passphrase_twice_in_Leap_and_Tumbleweed).
-- Though rather tedious, you could potentially improve security by:
-  - [Enrolling your own Secure Boot keys](#enrolling-your-own-keys)
-  - Reinstalling GRUB with `--no-shim-lock`
-  - Signing GRUB and the kernel with your own keys
-  - Removing shim and MOK from the boot chain
-  - Setting up hooks to automate these tasks for every update
-
-#### Other Distributions
-
-On systems which use [grub‑btrfs](https://github.com/Antynea/grub-btrfs) to mimic openSUSE (such as [my old Arch setup](https://github.com/tommytran732/Arch-Setup-Script)), there are a few things to keep in mind:
-
-- It will be easier to use LUKS1 than LUKS2 with PBKDF2 for this setup.
-  - I have run into issues where GRUB will detect a LUKS1 partition converted to LUKS2 with PBKDF2 but not a pre‑existing LUKS2 partition.
-- Include /boot in your root partition instead of as a seperate partition.
-  - With a seperate /boot partition, an evil maid attack can theoretically replace it with a malicious /boot partition. Unlocking the drive through a fake decryption prompt on the malicious partition will subsequently compromise the rest of the system.
-- [Enroll your own Secure Boot keys](#enrolling-your-own-keys)
-- Install GRUB with the `--no-shim-lock` option. The full command I use on Arch is:
-  ```
-  grub-install --target=x86_64-efi --efi-directory=/boot/efi --bootloader-id=GRUB --modules="normal test efi_gop efi_uga search echo linux all_video gfxmenu gfxterm_background gfxterm_menu gfxterm loadenv configfile gzio part_gpt cryptodisk luks gcry_rijndael gcry_sha256 btrfs tpm" --disable-shim-lock
-  ```
-- Sign GRUB and the kernel with your own keys
-- Remove shim and MOK from the boot chain (if applicable)
-- Set up hooks to automate these tasks for every update ([pacman hooks for Arch](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Unified_Extensible_Firmware_Interface/Secure_Boot#Signing_the_kernel_with_a_pacman_hook))
-- Disable the TPM from your firmware to prevent GRUB attempting [measured boot](https://www.gnu.org/software/grub/manual/grub/html_node/Measured-Boot.html), which [does not work with grub-btrfs](https://github.com/Antynea/grub-btrfs/issues/156).
 
 ### Notes on Secure Boot
 
-After setting up Secure Boot, it is crucial that you password-protect your UEFI settings (sometimes called 'supervisor' or 'administrator' password) --- otherwise an adversary can simply disable Secure Boot.
+After setting up Secure Boot, you should password-protect your UEFI settings (sometimes called 'supervisor' or 'administrator' password) as it is good security practice. This does not protect against an attacker with a programmer however - you need to pin PCRs to detect tampering as mentioned above.
 
 These recommendations can make you a little more resistant to evil maid attacks, but they [do not constitute a proper verified boot process](https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/guides/linux-hardening.html#verified-boot) as found on [Android](https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot), [ChromeOS](https://support.google.com/chromebook/answer/3438631), or [Windows](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/secure-the-windows-10-boot-process).