Mullvad is a fairly popular and generally trustworthy VPN provider. In this post, I will walk you through how to use the official Mullvad client in a ProxyVM on Qubes OS. This method is a lot more convenient than the [official guide](https://mullvad.net/en/help/qubes-os-4-and-mullvad-vpn/) from Mullvad (which recommends that you manually load in OpenVPN or Wireguard profiles) and will let you seamlessly switch between different location and network setups just as you would on a normal Linux installation.
I recommend that you make a new TemplateVM based on the latest Fedora GNOME template and remove all unnecessary packages that you might not use. This way, you can minimize the attack surface while not having to deal with missing dependencies like on a minimal template. With that being said, if you do manage to get the minimal template to fully work with Mullvad, feel free to [open a discussion on GitHub](https://github.com/orgs/PrivSec-dev/discussions) or [contact me directly](https://tommytran.io/contact) and I will update the post accordingly.
To work around [issue 3803](https://github.com/mullvad/mullvadvpn-app/issues/3803), we will be using systemd path to run `/usr/lib/qubes/qubes-setup-dnat-to-ns` every time Mullvad modifies `/etc/resolv.conf`. Create the following files:
Create an AppVM based on the TemplateVM you have just created. Set `sys-firewall` (or whatever FirewallVM you have connected to your `sys-net`) as the net qube. If you do not have such FirewallVM, use `sys-net` as the net qube. Next, go to the advanced tab and tick the `provides network access to other qubes` box.
Open the Mullvad VPN app. Go to `Settings` → `VPN settings` and toggle `Local network sharing`. Due to some strange interaction between qubes services and Mullvad VPN, certain apps will get internet connections while others do not if this toggle is not enabled. This toggle will **not** actually allow AppVMs connected to the ProxyVM to connect to the local network.
Enable `Lockdown mode` to ensure that the killswitch stays on even when the tunnel is disconnected.
## Additional Assurances
For additional assurances against VPN leaks, you can optionally add these 2 lines to `/rw/config/qubes-firewall-user-script`:
```bash
nft add rule qubes custom-forward oifname eth0 counter drop
nft add rule ip6 qubes custom-forward oifname eth0 counter drop
```
This is not strictly necessary, as I have not observed any leaks with the VPN killswitch provided by the app.
With this current setup, the ProxyVM you have just created will be responsible for handling Firewall rules for the qubes behind it. This is not ideal, as this is still a fairly large VM, and there is a risk that Mullvad or some other apps may interfere with its firewall handling.
Instead, I highly recommend that you [create a minimal Mirage FirewallVM](/posts/qubes/firewalling-with-mirageos-on-qubes-os/) and use it as a firewall **behind** the Mullvad ProxyVM. Other AppVMs then should use the Mirage Firewall as the net qube instead. This way, you can make sure that firewall rules are properly enforced.