Common protocols Email and SMS MFA Email and SMS MFA are examples of the weaker MFA protocols. Email MFA is not great as whoever controls your email account can typically both reset your password and recieve your MFA verification."><metaname=authorcontent="Tommy"><linkrel=canonicalhref=https://privsec.dev/knowledge/multi-factor-authentication/><linkcrossorigin=anonymoushref=/assets/css/stylesheet.8b523f1730c922e314350296d83fd666efa16519ca136320a93df674d00b6325.cssintegrity="sha256-i1I/FzDJIuMUNQKW2D/WZu+hZRnKE2MgqT32dNALYyU="rel="preload stylesheet"as=style><scriptdefercrossorigin=anonymoussrc=/assets/js/highlight.f413e19d0714851f6474e7ee9632408e58ac146fbdbe62747134bea2fa3415e0.jsintegrity="sha256-9BPhnQcUhR9kdOfuljJAjlisFG+9vmJ0cTS+ovo0FeA="onload=hljs.initHighlightingOnLoad()></script>
Common protocols Email and SMS MFA Email and SMS MFA are examples of the weaker MFA protocols. Email MFA is not great as whoever controls your email account can typically both reset your password and recieve your MFA verification."><metaproperty="og:type"content="article"><metaproperty="og:url"content="https://privsec.dev/knowledge/multi-factor-authentication/"><metaproperty="article:section"content="knowledge"><metaname=twitter:cardcontent="summary"><metaname=twitter:titlecontent="Multi-factor Authentication"><metaname=twitter:descriptioncontent="Multi-factorauthenticationisasecuritymechanismthatrequiresadditionalverificationbeyondyourusername(oremail)andpassword.Thisusuallycomesintheformofaonetimepasscode,apushnotification,orplugginginandtappingahardwaresecuritykey.
Common protocols Email and SMS MFA Email and SMS MFA are examples of the weaker MFA protocols. Email MFA is not great as whoever controls your email account can typically both reset your password and recieve your MFA verification."><scripttype=application/ld+json>{"@context":"https://schema.org","@type":"BreadcrumbList","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Knowledge Base","item":"https://privsec.dev/knowledge/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":3,"name":"Multi-factor Authentication","item":"https://privsec.dev/knowledge/multi-factor-authentication/"}]}</script><scripttype=application/ld+json>{"@context":"https://schema.org","@type":"BlogPosting","headline":"Multi-factorAuthentication","name":"Multi-factorAuthentication","description":"Multi-factorauthenticationisasecuritymechanismthatrequiresadditionalverificationbeyondyourusername(oremail)andpassword.Thisusuallycomesintheformofaonetimepasscode,apushnotification,orplugginginandtappingahardwaresecuritykey.\nCommonprotocolsEmailandSMSMFAEmailandSMSMFAareexamplesoftheweakerMFAprotocols.EmailMFAisnotgreataswhoevercontrolsyouremailaccountcantypicallybothresetyourpasswordandrecieveyourMFAverification.","keywords":["knowledgebase","security"],"articleBody":"Multi-factorauthenticationisasecuritymechanismthatrequiresadditionalverificationbeyondyourusername(oremail)andpassword.Thisusuallycomesintheformofaonetimepasscode,apushnotification,orplugginginandtappingahardwaresecuritykey.\nCommonprotocolsEmailandSMSMFAEmailandSMSMFAareexamplesoftheweakerMFAprotocols.EmailMFAisnotgreataswhoevercontrolsyouremailaccountcantypicallybothresetyourpasswordandrecieveyourMFAverification.SMSontheotherhandisproblematicduetothelackofanykindofencryption,makingitvulnerabletosniffing.Simswapattacks,ifcarriedoutsuccessfully,willallowanattackertorecieveyouronetimepasscodewhilelockingyououtofyourownaccount.Incertaincases,websitesorservicesmayalsoallowtheusertoresettheiraccountloginbycallingthemusingthephonenumberusedforMFA,whichcouldbefakedwithaspoofedCallerID.\nOnlyusetheseprotocolswhenitistheonlyoptionyouhave,andbeverycarefulwithSMSMFAasitcouldactuallyworsenyoursecurity.\nPushConfirmationsPushconfirmationMFAistypicallyanotificationbeingsenttoanapponyourphoneaskingyoutoconfirmnewaccountlogins.ThismethodisalotbetterthanSMSoremail,sinceanattackertypicallywouldn’tbeabletogetthesepushnotificationswithouthavinganalreadylogged-indevice.\nPushcomfirmationinmostcasesrelyonathirdpartyproviderlikeDuo.Thismeansthattrustisplacedinaserverthatneitheryounoryourserviceprovidercontrol.AmaliciouspushconfirmationservercouldcompromiseyourMFAorprofileyoubasedonwhichwebsiteandaccountyouusewiththeservice.\nEvenifthepushnotificationapplicationandserverisprovidedbyfirstpartyasisthecasewithMicrosoftloginandMicrosoftAuthenticator,thereisstillariskofyouaccidentallytappingontheconfirmationbutton.\nTime-basedOne-timePassword(TOTP)TOTPisoneofthemostcommonformsofMFAavailable.WhenyousetupTOTP,yousetupa“sharedsecret”withtheservicethatyouintendtouseandstoreitinyourauthenticationapp.\nThetime-limitedcodeisthenderivedfromthesharedsecretandthecurrenttime.Asthecodeisonlyvalidforashorttime,withoutaccesstothesharedsecret,anadversarycannotgeneratenewcodes.\nIfyouhaveaYubikey,youshouldstorethe“sharedsecrets”onthekeyitselfusingtheYubicoAuthenticatorapp.Aftertheinitialsetup,theYubicoAuthenticatorwillonlyexposethe6digitcodetothemachineitisrunningon,butnotthesharedsecret.Additionalsecuritycanbesetupbyrequiringtouchconfirmation,protectingdigitcodesnotinusedfromacompromisedoperatingsystem.\n